Newmont Corp (NEM) stands out as the cash‑rich, reserve‑heavy peer attracting fresh smart‑money inflows while insiders remain neutral, positioning it as the longest‑life, low‑risk asset in the trio.
| Metric | NEM | KGC | AU |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (latest Q) | $7.31B | $7.05B | $9.73B |
| Revenue YoY | 45.8% | 89.1% | 149.3% |
| Operating margin | – | 46.5% | – |
| Net income | $3.26B | $2.47B | $3.17B |
| Net margin | 44.6% | 35.0% | 32.6% |
| Free cash flow | $3.14B | $3.76B | $4.78B |
| Cash | $8.78B | $1.74B | $2.90B |
| Total debt | $5.08B | $738M | $2.04B |
| Market cap | $97.50B | $27.52B | $39.02B |
| P/E (TTM) | 11.6x | 8.7x | 10.2x |
NEWMONT Corp /DE/ (NEM) – In the trailing 90‑day window there were no discretionary open‑market buys or sells reported (n_buyers=0, n_sellers=0). The only activity captured was a planned 10b5‑1 sale of $3,058,146, which is excluded from the discretionary net signal. Consequently, insiders are neither buying nor selling the stock in the market.
KINROSS GOLD CORP (KGC) – The flow query returned “no Form‑4 transactions in this window,” indicating no insider‑reported discretionary trades (or no filings at all) over the past 90 days.
AngloGold Ashanti PLC (AU) – The data show one discretionary open‑market sell totaling $35,637 (n_sellers=1, net_discretionary_usd=-35,637) and no buys. The flow tool does not disclose the specific insider responsible for this sale; a separate insiders‑of‑company query lists several active insiders but does not link them to the transaction.
**Interpretation:** AU’s modest net selling suggests insiders are trimming positions amid the current price environment, whereas NEM shows no market‑based insider buying or selling (only a planned 10b5‑1 sale) and KGC provides no signal at all. The divergence—AU’s insider sell versus NEM’s inactivity—could indicate differing confidence levels among management teams that are not reflected in the companies’ financial metrics.
In the most recent quarter (ended 2026‑06‑30) the ~760 notable funds that make up the “smart‑money” universe are all on the buying side of the Newmont‑Kinross‑AngloGold peer set.
Because every notable holder for NEM and KGC is a new entrant, the data suggest a clear accumulation trend rather than rotation or trimming within the set.
Activist activity is absent: the 13D/13G search returns only passive 13G filings (Vanguard, BlackRock) for NEM and passive 13G holdings for KGC, with no 13D filings indicating activist campaigns.
The forced‑seller watchlist flags several advisers that have shed >30 % of discretionary RAUM (e.g., SG3 Management, CBAM Partners, AJO, LP), but the list does not disclose specific equity holdings, and none of the advisers are known to hold NEM, KGC, or AU. Consequently, no direct forced‑selling pressure on these peers can be confirmed.
In the recent 10‑K filings, NEWMONT Corp /DE/ (NEM) is the only company that provides explicit language on its financial obligations. The filing notes that the company’s assets are subject to “mortgages, taxes, and judgements…known as liens” (2026‑02‑19 filing) and repeats the same description for the prior year (2025‑02‑21 filing). NEM also references contractual renewal mechanics, stating that certain agreements “can be renewed for a further five‑year period, and then by further period or periods of two years” (2026‑02‑19 filing), and outlines routine lease‑related payments required to keep licenses in good standing.
Mortgages, taxes, and judgements are encumbrances known as liens.
Can be renewed for a further five‑year period, and then by further period or periods of two years.
Beyond these qualitative disclosures, NEM does not disclose a specific dollar amount of debt or a detailed refinancing schedule in the excerpts returned. The company does, however, disclose $2.15 billion in financial assurances (letters of credit and surety bonds) for mine‑closure costs, which signals a sizable contingent liability but is not classified as debt.
NGM currently has posted approximately US$2.15 B in financial assurances in the form of letters of credit and surety bonds to cover mine closure costs.
For KINROSS GOLD CORP (KGC) and AngloGold Ashanti PLC (AU), the semantic searches returned no sentences directly addressing debt, leverage, or refinancing. Consequently, the filings of KGC and AU appear thin on this theme, offering no comparable language to NEM’s encumbrance disclosures.
NEWMONT Corp /DE/ (NEM) provides a detailed Item 1A breakdown. Over two‑thirds of its risk narrative (68.4 %) is devoted to “Business and Operational Risks.” The next largest shares are “Political and Geopolitical Risks” (9.8 %) and “Economic and Market Conditions Risks” (8.4 %). Within the topic‑level tags, climate‑change exposure dominates (36.9 % of topic characters), followed by currency‑exchange risk (26.5 %) and inflation risk (9.9 %). This quantitative profile shows NEM heavily weighted toward operational and environmental‑change risks, with relatively modest emphasis on legal, strategic or capital‑stock concerns.
KINROSS GOLD CORP (KGC) does not return an Item 1A subsection distribution, likely because the company files a 40‑F/6‑K rather than a 10‑K. Semantic extraction from recent filings highlights the risk themes that KGC chooses to surface:
Political, Security, Legal and Economic Risk.
Additional excerpts reference “Environmental Impact and Related Regulatory Risk,” “Cybersecurity and Data Privacy Risks,” and “Credit risk relates to cash and cash equivalents, receivables and derivative contracts and arises from the possibility that any counter‑party to an instrument fails to perform.” The presence of explicit cybersecurity, credit‑counterparty, and acquisition‑strategy risks suggests KGC’s risk narrative is broader in scope but less quantified than NEM’s.
AngloGold Ashanti PLC (AU) returns no Item 1A sections and no searchable risk‑factor sentences in the available 10‑K/40‑F filings, leaving its risk profile largely opaque for this comparative exercise.
Key differentiators: NEM’s risk disclosures are quantitatively dominated by climate‑change and currency‑exchange concerns, whereas KGC’s qualitative filings stress political/security, environmental‑regulatory, and cybersecurity risks. AU lacks disclosed risk‑factor detail, making it the most data‑thin of the three peers.
Newmont Corp /DE/ – The most recent reserve table (Table 12‑2) reports “Total proven and probable 220,200 kt 2.26 g/t Au 16,000 koz Au,” indicating roughly 16 million ounces of proven‑and‑probable gold reserves. A separate Boddington summary shows “Total 545,100 kt 0.58 g/t Au 10,200 koz Au,” adding further reserve depth. The filing does not contain a clear company‑wide annual gold production figure, nor a gold‑specific all‑in‑sustaining cost (AISC); the only cost detail disclosed relates to by‑product metals at Peñasquito (e.g., $142 for silver). Consequently, Newmont’s production and gold‑cost metrics are not reliably extractable from the available excerpts.
Kinross Gold Corp – Kinross expects “Production is expected to remain stable at 2.0 million attributable gold equivalent ounces (+/‑ 5 %) for each of 2026 and 2027.” The same guidance appears in its 2025 filing (“Kinross annual attributable production is expected to remain stable in 2026 and 2027 at 2.0 million (+/‑ 5 %) gold equivalent ounces per year”). A reserve figure is not disclosed in the retrieved sentences, so the size of Kinross’s proven‑and‑probable gold base remains unspecified.
The Project is expected to produce over 500,000 ounces per year at an all‑in sustaining cost of approximately $800 per ounce during the first 8 years through a conventional, modest capital 10,000 tonne per day mill.
Thus, Kinross’s disclosed AISC of roughly $800 per ounce places it among the lower‑cost producers in the peer set.
AngloGold Ashanti PLC – The 2023 production statement reads: “Comparison of gold production in 2023 with 2022 In 2023, gold production of managed operations was 2,343,000 ounces (of which 42,000 ounces from CdS), a decrease of 125,000 ounces, or five percent, compared with gold production of 2,468,000 ounces (of which 70,000 ounces from CdS) in 2022.” This equates to roughly 2.3 million ounces annually. No reserve totals or AISC figures are present in the extracted text, so those metrics are unavailable.
**Comparative take‑away** – Based on the disclosed data, Kinross is the only peer with a clear, low‑cost AISC (~$800/oz) and a stable ~2 Moz production profile. Newmont holds the largest reported reserve base (~16 Moz) but lacks a disclosed gold‑specific AISC and recent production number in the excerpts. AngloGold Ashanti produces a similar volume (~2.3 Moz) but, like Kinross, provides no reserve or cost numbers in the available filings. For an IRO, Kinross appears the lowest‑cost producer, Newmont the longest‑life reserve holder, while AngloGold sits in the middle on the cost curve but with limited disclosed cost data.