Snapshots taken IRA 09/25, Merrill CMA 09/17, third account 09/03 — different moments in time, not one consistent day. Figures below are for orientation, not a trading decision.
About three-quarters of everything is in things that have nothing to do with the AI trade: dividend blue-chips (Coke, J&J, P&G, Merck, Exxon, Kinder Morgan), bonds, international stocks, value funds, a REIT, an oil royalty trust. The last time a tech bubble burst (2000–2002), the Nasdaq fell roughly 78% — and portfolios that looked like the Merrill account (consumer staples, healthcare, energy, value) were flat to up over the same stretch. Nobody can promise that repeats. But this is structurally the kind of portfolio that got through it last time.
Roughly 300 shares, about $153,000, in the third account. It's the single biggest lever on the AI worry — not the biotechs. Keeping it is a perfectly defensible choice (see below for why); the question is what to do around it so it doesn't dominate every bad day.
EDIT and SPRO are down 90–91%, but together they're now $1,376 — 0.2% of the portfolio. The damage already happened. The one worth a look is GERN (Geron), a ~$135 position: its cash burn quadrupled in two quarters, leaving roughly 9–10 months of runway. Tiny position, genuine distress signal. Detail further down.
The IRA runs a target-allocation model, and the targets add up to exactly 100% — so each unknown ticker occupies a specific slot in a deliberate design. That, plus the price per share implied by the file, identifies both with high confidence. Still worth a two-second confirmation on the custodian's website.
| In the file | Almost certainly | Implied price | Real price, Sept 2026 | Why |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OWO 2.5% target | IWO — iShares Russell 2000 Growth | $360.69 | ~$360–371 | Sits at 2.5% right beside IWN (Russell 2000 Value) at 2.5% — a classic small-cap growth/value pair. One letter off (I→O). |
| VUE 13% target | VEU — Vanguard FTSE All-World ex-US | $83.62 | ~$83–86 | The 13% international-developed sleeve that pairs with VWO's 4% emerging markets. Two letters transposed. |
Both are plain, low-cost, broadly diversified funds — not stale or mystery holdings. And VEU at 13% means the IRA has meaningful international exposure, which is one more thing pulling in a different direction from US mega-cap tech.
Because this IRA is inherited: one thing for a CPA to confirm is the required-distribution schedule. Most non-spouse inheritances after 2019 must be fully drawn down within 10 years; spousal inheritances follow different rules. If this account is on a forced drawdown clock, that's a reason for it to carry a bit less equity risk than the model currently holds — a planning question, not an emergency.
Twenty years is a long time to hold something. Not selling is a reasonable position, and there are concrete financial reasons — not just sentiment — that it may be the right one.
Microsoft traded around $25–30 in 2006. At ~$511 today, roughly 95% of the position's value is unrealized gain — on the order of $145,000 of the $153,000. Whether that matters depends entirely on one fact we don't know yet: what kind of account is the third account?
Microsoft is not a speculative AI startup. It's roughly a $280 billion-revenue company generating on the order of $70 billion a year in free cash flow, with more cash than debt, whose core businesses (Office/Microsoft 365, Windows, the non-AI parts of Azure, LinkedIn, gaming) would keep generating cash even if the AI build-out turns out to be overdone. In an AI bust, Microsoft's risk is "they overspent on data centers and the stock re-rates lower for a while" — not "the company fails."
The honest historical worst case is worth stating plainly: after the 2000 bubble, Microsoft fell about 60% from peak to trough and didn't get back above its 1999 high until 2016 — roughly 14 years — even though the business grew the entire time. That's the realistic bad scenario for a mega-cap leader after a bubble: a deep drawdown and a long flat stretch, not a wipeout. For him, a 50% Microsoft drawdown would be about −$77,000, or ~10% of the total portfolio. Painful. Not catastrophic.
A deliberately harsh "AI unwind" scenario — Microsoft −50%, the growth ETF −40%, the S&P fund −35%, Cisco/HP −30%, and everything else flat:
| Holding | Value now | Scenario | Loss |
|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft | $153,363 | −50% | −$76,700 |
| IUSG (growth ETF) | $37,844 | −40% | −$15,100 |
| SPY | $30,874 | −35% | −$10,800 |
| Cisco + HP | ~$29,900 | −30% | −$9,000 |
| Everything else (~74%) | ~$530,000 | flat | $0 |
| Total | ≈$781,000 | ≈ −$112,000 (−14%) |
For scale: an ordinary 60/40 stock/bond portfolio lost about 16–17% in 2022 and 25–30% in 2008. So his severe AI-crash scenario costs roughly a normal bad year — because three-quarters of the money isn't in the trade. And that's before any offset from the dividend/value/energy names, which historically did well in exactly that kind of rotation. This is the number that should ease the fear: the worst plausible outcome is survivable, and it's already mostly diversified away.
Steps 1, 2, and 3 right away — all zero-tax, zero-complexity, and together they cut AI exposure and raise the defensive sleeve without touching Microsoft. Then decide, with the advisor and live option quotes in hand, whether step 5 (Microsoft puts) or step 7 (SPY puts) is worth the annual premium for peace of mind on the position he's keeping. That's a conservative plan that lets him hold what he wants to hold and sleep.
Nobody can. Alan Greenspan's "irrational exuberance" warning came in December 1996; the Nasdaq more than doubled after that before it finally topped in March 2000. People who sold on the warning missed three years of gains and still had to guess when to get back in. The whole point of diversifying and hedging is that you don't have to predict — you just make sure the bad scenario is survivable, which, per the table above, it already is.
IUSG carries roughly 37–40% of its weight in Nvidia, Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, and Broadcom; SPY about 28–30%. Cisco and HP are networking/hardware names with some AI-buildout narrative attached, but they're not the same bet as hyperscaler capex — included for completeness, not as equivalent risk.
Why the worry has substance right now: current commentary (Jefferies' Chris Wood, among others) flags that hyperscaler AI capex is increasingly debt-financed — six major players are on pace for roughly $916 billion of combined capex over the next 12 months, rising toward $1.2 trillion the year after; Amazon, Alphabet, and Microsoft are each spending over 100% of their cloud revenue on capex this year; and capex-to-revenue has crossed ~22% against a historical 11–16% norm, a pattern some analysts compare to the run-up before the 2001 telecom bust. None of that makes a crash certain or imminent. It does mean the concern is real and widely shared — and it lines up with exactly the exposure this portfolio carries.
| Ticker | Position | Cash runway | Trend | Read |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GERN Geron Corp | ~$135 (3rd acct) | ~0.8 yr | Deteriorating | Burn nearly quadrupled in 2 quarters ($5.5M → $19.7M/qtr); 3 straight declining quarters. Has one approved drug (RYTELO) — the commercial ramp isn't yet outrunning spend. The one name here with a real distress signature. |
| EDIT Editas Medicine | $816 / $8,132 cost (Merrill) | ~4.0 yr | Not deteriorating | Real, growing revenue ($2.8M → $11.9M last quarter). The −90% is a sunk cost, not a sign of imminent cash crisis. Hold/sell is about thesis, not runway. |
| SPRO Spero Therapeutics | $560 / $6,511 cost (Merrill) | n/a (cash-flow positive) | Not deteriorating | Recent quarters show positive operating cash flow — a licensing/milestone payment landed ($41.3M revenue, $31.5M net income in the last 10-K). Less fragile than the −91% chart suggests. |
| IOVA Iovance Biotherapeutics | ~$900 (3rd acct) | ~2.2 yr | Trending down | Was 5.65 years three quarters ago, now 2.24 — a real deceleration, not yet flagged as distressed. Has an approved drug (AMTAGVI). Watch, not urgent. |
| RVMD / RVMDW Revolution Medicines | ~$6,300 combined (3rd acct) | ~5.3 yr | Well-funded | A large, well-capitalized biotech ($3.9B cash, $37B+ market cap) — a different risk class from the others. The warrant (RVMDW) expires 2026-12-17 — that date matters regardless of fundamentals; worth deciding on before it lapses. |
Tax-loss harvesting on EDIT/SPRO is a legitimate small housekeeping item even though the dollar risk from here is trivial — realizing the loss can offset gains elsewhere, and there's plenty of embedded gain in the same Merrill account to offset. A CPA question, not an investment one.