Portfolio Review · Second pass · Informational, not investment advice

Where things stand, and what keeping Microsoft actually looks like

Snapshots taken IRA 09/25, Merrill CMA 09/17, third account 09/03 — different moments in time, not one consistent day. Figures below are for orientation, not a trading decision.

≈$781,000
Combined, all 3 accounts (see caveats)
~14%
In cash / bonds today
~26%
In AI-capex-linked names
~74%
Not in the AI trade at all
The short version

Start here

The portfolio is already built like a tech-bust survivor. That's the main thing to know.

About three-quarters of everything is in things that have nothing to do with the AI trade: dividend blue-chips (Coke, J&J, P&G, Merck, Exxon, Kinder Morgan), bonds, international stocks, value funds, a REIT, an oil royalty trust. The last time a tech bubble burst (2000–2002), the Nasdaq fell roughly 78% — and portfolios that looked like the Merrill account (consumer staples, healthcare, energy, value) were flat to up over the same stretch. Nobody can promise that repeats. But this is structurally the kind of portfolio that got through it last time.

Microsoft is the one real concentration — about 1 dollar in 5 of everything.

Roughly 300 shares, about $153,000, in the third account. It's the single biggest lever on the AI worry — not the biotechs. Keeping it is a perfectly defensible choice (see below for why); the question is what to do around it so it doesn't dominate every bad day.

The "loser biotechs" mostly don't matter anymore in dollars. One small one has a real cash problem.

EDIT and SPRO are down 90–91%, but together they're now $1,376 — 0.2% of the portfolio. The damage already happened. The one worth a look is GERN (Geron), a ~$135 position: its cash burn quadrupled in two quarters, leaving roughly 9–10 months of runway. Tiny position, genuine distress signal. Detail further down.

The three accounts

What's actually held, where

IRA (inherited)
$244,222
All index funds, running a deliberate allocation model (the targets sum to exactly 100%). ~29% bonds/cash (AGG, USHY, JPST, BWX); ~71% equities — US value (VTV, the largest), US growth (IUSG), S&P 500 (SPY), international developed (VEU, 13%), emerging (VWO), mid-cap (IWR), small-cap value + growth (IWN + IWO). Lowest single-name risk of the three by a wide margin.
Merrill CMA
$317,635
Blue-chip dividend names (AT&T, Coca-Cola, ExxonMobil, J&J, Merck, Pfizer, P&G, Kinder Morgan, Kimco REIT, Organon, Viatris, Warner Bros Discovery, a Permian oil royalty trust) plus EDIT and SPRO. $33,595 sitting in a bank-deposit sweep. Very large embedded gains — see the tax note below.
Third account (individual positions)
~$219,000 (estimate)
Dominated by Microsoft (~70% of this account). Also Morgan Stanley, Cisco, HP, Southwest, Tetra Technologies, Airgain, Mirion, and small positions in GERN, IOVA, RVMD (+ a warrant), and NAK (Northern Dynasty — a single-asset Alaska mining stock in decades of permitting litigation; its own risk, unrelated to AI or biotech).
Mystery tickers, solved

"OWO" and "VUE" are typos for two ordinary index funds

The IRA runs a target-allocation model, and the targets add up to exactly 100% — so each unknown ticker occupies a specific slot in a deliberate design. That, plus the price per share implied by the file, identifies both with high confidence. Still worth a two-second confirmation on the custodian's website.

In the fileAlmost certainlyImplied priceReal price, Sept 2026Why
OWO
2.5% target
IWO — iShares Russell 2000 Growth$360.69~$360–371Sits at 2.5% right beside IWN (Russell 2000 Value) at 2.5% — a classic small-cap growth/value pair. One letter off (I→O).
VUE
13% target
VEU — Vanguard FTSE All-World ex-US$83.62~$83–86The 13% international-developed sleeve that pairs with VWO's 4% emerging markets. Two letters transposed.

Both are plain, low-cost, broadly diversified funds — not stale or mystery holdings. And VEU at 13% means the IRA has meaningful international exposure, which is one more thing pulling in a different direction from US mega-cap tech.

Because this IRA is inherited: one thing for a CPA to confirm is the required-distribution schedule. Most non-spouse inheritances after 2019 must be fully drawn down within 10 years; spousal inheritances follow different rules. If this account is on a forced drawdown clock, that's a reason for it to carry a bit less equity risk than the model currently holds — a planning question, not an emergency.

The core question

Keeping Microsoft — what that actually looks like

Twenty years is a long time to hold something. Not selling is a reasonable position, and there are concrete financial reasons — not just sentiment — that it may be the right one.

Why not selling can be the smarter move

Microsoft traded around $25–30 in 2006. At ~$511 today, roughly 95% of the position's value is unrealized gain — on the order of $145,000 of the $153,000. Whether that matters depends entirely on one fact we don't know yet: what kind of account is the third account?

The honest version of the Microsoft-specific risk

Microsoft is not a speculative AI startup. It's roughly a $280 billion-revenue company generating on the order of $70 billion a year in free cash flow, with more cash than debt, whose core businesses (Office/Microsoft 365, Windows, the non-AI parts of Azure, LinkedIn, gaming) would keep generating cash even if the AI build-out turns out to be overdone. In an AI bust, Microsoft's risk is "they overspent on data centers and the stock re-rates lower for a while" — not "the company fails."

The honest historical worst case is worth stating plainly: after the 2000 bubble, Microsoft fell about 60% from peak to trough and didn't get back above its 1999 high until 2016 — roughly 14 years — even though the business grew the entire time. That's the realistic bad scenario for a mega-cap leader after a bubble: a deep drawdown and a long flat stretch, not a wipeout. For him, a 50% Microsoft drawdown would be about −$77,000, or ~10% of the total portfolio. Painful. Not catastrophic.

The whole-portfolio stress test

A deliberately harsh "AI unwind" scenario — Microsoft −50%, the growth ETF −40%, the S&P fund −35%, Cisco/HP −30%, and everything else flat:

HoldingValue nowScenarioLoss
Microsoft$153,363−50%−$76,700
IUSG (growth ETF)$37,844−40%−$15,100
SPY$30,874−35%−$10,800
Cisco + HP~$29,900−30%−$9,000
Everything else (~74%)~$530,000flat$0
Total≈$781,000≈ −$112,000 (−14%)

For scale: an ordinary 60/40 stock/bond portfolio lost about 16–17% in 2022 and 25–30% in 2008. So his severe AI-crash scenario costs roughly a normal bad year — because three-quarters of the money isn't in the trade. And that's before any offset from the dividend/value/energy names, which historically did well in exactly that kind of rotation. This is the number that should ease the fear: the worst plausible outcome is survivable, and it's already mostly diversified away.

Things that reduce the risk without selling Microsoft — ranked by how painless they are

  1. Rebalance inside the IRA.no tax · no complexity
    IUSG ($37,844) is the most AI-concentrated thing he owns after Microsoft itself — roughly 37–40% of it is Nvidia, Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, and Broadcom. Moving some of it into VTV (value — already his largest IRA holding) or VEU (international) cuts implied AI exposure by up to ~$15,000, and because it's inside an IRA there's zero tax consequence. Even taking IUSG's target from 14% to 7% and putting the difference in VTV/VEU is a meaningful, painless de-risk. The easiest single move on this list.
  2. Put the idle $33,595 at Merrill to work defensively.no tax
    It's sitting in a bank-deposit sweep. Short or intermediate Treasuries, or a short-term bond fund, would build the defensive cushion from ~14% to ~18% of the portfolio without touching a single stock. (TIPS are the specific instrument if his worry is "debt-financed capex eventually means inflation.")
  3. Stop reinvesting into the AI-heavy sleeve.no tax
    If dividends or contributions auto-reinvest into Microsoft or IUSG, redirect them to bonds, value, or international. Concentration drifts down over time without ever selling anything.
  4. Trim a slice, not the position.small tax if taxable
    Selling 20% of Microsoft (60 shares, ~$31,000) drops it from ~19% of the portfolio to ~15%. In a taxable account that realizes roughly $29,000 of gain — maybe $4,000–7,000 in tax; in an IRA, nothing. A middle path that respects twenty years of holding.
  5. Protective puts on Microsoft — the actual "insurance."annual premium
    300 shares = 3 put contracts. Buy puts struck ~15–20% below today's price, 12–18 months out (a "LEAPS" put just means the long-dated kind, so it doesn't need re-buying every month). If Microsoft crashes, the puts pay off roughly the drop below the strike, offsetting most of the loss. If it doesn't crash, the premium is gone — same as any insurance. Rough cost for long-dated out-of-the-money puts on a mega-cap: very roughly 3–6% of the position's value per year, so ~$5,000–9,000 a year on $153,000 — only a live quote is a real number. Puts never force a sale of the shares.
  6. A collar — cheaper insurance, with a catch.near-zero premium, but see catch
    Sell a call ~15–20% above today's price to pay for the put; net cost can be near zero. The catch for someone avoiding a taxable sale: if Microsoft rallies above the call strike, the shares can be called away — a forced sale, which is exactly the tax event he's trying to avoid. It's manageable (roll or buy back the call before expiration), but collars need an advisor who will actually watch them, and they cap the upside for the collar period.
  7. Hedge the market instead of the stock.annual premium, usually cheaper
    SPY puts are the most liquid and cheapest per dollar of protection. One long-dated SPY put position hedges the scenario he actually fears — "the AI unwind drags the whole market down" — across Microsoft, IUSG, and SPY at once. Imperfect (SPY won't fall exactly like Microsoft), but simpler and often cheaper than stock-specific puts.

A coherent, no-panic package to take to the advisor

Steps 1, 2, and 3 right away — all zero-tax, zero-complexity, and together they cut AI exposure and raise the defensive sleeve without touching Microsoft. Then decide, with the advisor and live option quotes in hand, whether step 5 (Microsoft puts) or step 7 (SPY puts) is worth the annual premium for peace of mind on the position he's keeping. That's a conservative plan that lets him hold what he wants to hold and sleep.

On timing the crash

Nobody can. Alan Greenspan's "irrational exuberance" warning came in December 1996; the Nasdaq more than doubled after that before it finally topped in March 2000. People who sold on the warning missed three years of gains and still had to guess when to get back in. The whole point of diversifying and hedging is that you don't have to predict — you just make sure the bad scenario is survivable, which, per the table above, it already is.

Deep dive

The AI-capex concentration

MSFT (direct)
$153K
CSCO (direct)
~$26.7K
IUSG (implied)
~$14.5K
SPY (implied)
~$9K
HPQ (direct)
~$3.2K

IUSG carries roughly 37–40% of its weight in Nvidia, Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, and Broadcom; SPY about 28–30%. Cisco and HP are networking/hardware names with some AI-buildout narrative attached, but they're not the same bet as hyperscaler capex — included for completeness, not as equivalent risk.

Why the worry has substance right now: current commentary (Jefferies' Chris Wood, among others) flags that hyperscaler AI capex is increasingly debt-financed — six major players are on pace for roughly $916 billion of combined capex over the next 12 months, rising toward $1.2 trillion the year after; Amazon, Alphabet, and Microsoft are each spending over 100% of their cloud revenue on capex this year; and capex-to-revenue has crossed ~22% against a historical 11–16% norm, a pattern some analysts compare to the run-up before the 2001 telecom bust. None of that makes a crash certain or imminent. It does mean the concern is real and widely shared — and it lines up with exactly the exposure this portfolio carries.

Deep dive

The biotech names, one by one

TickerPositionCash runwayTrendRead
GERN
Geron Corp
~$135 (3rd acct)~0.8 yrDeterioratingBurn nearly quadrupled in 2 quarters ($5.5M → $19.7M/qtr); 3 straight declining quarters. Has one approved drug (RYTELO) — the commercial ramp isn't yet outrunning spend. The one name here with a real distress signature.
EDIT
Editas Medicine
$816 / $8,132 cost (Merrill)~4.0 yrNot deterioratingReal, growing revenue ($2.8M → $11.9M last quarter). The −90% is a sunk cost, not a sign of imminent cash crisis. Hold/sell is about thesis, not runway.
SPRO
Spero Therapeutics
$560 / $6,511 cost (Merrill)n/a (cash-flow positive)Not deterioratingRecent quarters show positive operating cash flow — a licensing/milestone payment landed ($41.3M revenue, $31.5M net income in the last 10-K). Less fragile than the −91% chart suggests.
IOVA
Iovance Biotherapeutics
~$900 (3rd acct)~2.2 yrTrending downWas 5.65 years three quarters ago, now 2.24 — a real deceleration, not yet flagged as distressed. Has an approved drug (AMTAGVI). Watch, not urgent.
RVMD / RVMDW
Revolution Medicines
~$6,300 combined (3rd acct)~5.3 yrWell-fundedA large, well-capitalized biotech ($3.9B cash, $37B+ market cap) — a different risk class from the others. The warrant (RVMDW) expires 2026-12-17 — that date matters regardless of fundamentals; worth deciding on before it lapses.

Tax-loss harvesting on EDIT/SPRO is a legitimate small housekeeping item even though the dollar risk from here is trivial — realizing the loss can offset gains elsewhere, and there's plenty of embedded gain in the same Merrill account to offset. A CPA question, not an investment one.

What to confirm before acting on any of this

Open questions and caveats

This is data-and-pattern analysis, not licensed financial or tax advice. It's built from real filings, real fundamentals, and current market commentary — but it doesn't know his full tax situation, other assets, income needs, time horizon, or risk tolerance. Options involve real, ongoing costs and can expire worthless. Every idea above is a starting point for a conversation with his actual advisor and CPA, not a set of instructions.